American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. 4. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. 10. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Operation Fast and Furious 10 And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. 13. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. $22. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. He is the author of. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. Congress supported the resolution with The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. 14. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. 17. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. 136-137. (2021, February 16). These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. . (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). We have no intention of yielding to pressure. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. 11. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. 1. Fluoride. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. Vietnam is a very watery country. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. 426-436. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. 8. . Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. That very night, the idea was put to the test. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. Naval Institute. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. 15. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. 9/11. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. Hickman, Kennedy. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. 5. There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. Here's why he couldn't walk away. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. 4. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence IV-2 to IV-4. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2.